APT Threat Landscape in APAC 2025: Industrialization of Intrusions
Summary:
Threat activity across the Asia-Pacific region is continuing to intensify, with more than 510 advanced persistent threat (APT) operations recorded globally in 2025, according to TeamT5. Taiwan remains the most heavily targeted location, accounting for 173 of the tracked attacks, far exceeding any other country in the region. Researchers say the activity is largely driven by China-linked threat actors and reflects Taiwan’s strategic importance in regional geopolitics and the global technology supply chain, with the island increasingly used as a testing ground for new intrusion tools and techniques before they are deployed more broadly.
Several key technical trends stand out in this activity. According to TeamT5, attackers are increasingly shifting away from traditional endpoints and instead targeting network edge devices such as firewalls, routers, and VPN appliances, with TeamT5 tracking 27 critical vulnerabilities in 2025, most of them affecting these systems. In many cases, exploitation is followed by the installation of custom backdoors that can survive reboots and even persist after patches are applied.
Threat actors are also increasingly abusing IoT and NAS devices as quiet, low-profile relay infrastructure, allowing them to obscure command-and-control traffic and exfiltrate data without raising suspicion. These devices blend into normal network activity, making it difficult for defenders to spot malicious operations in real time.
At the same time, supply chain attacks are accelerating, with Chinese-linked actors targeting IT service providers and telecom operators as stepping stones into government, military, and critical infrastructure networks. By exploiting these trusted relationships, attackers can bypass conventional defenses, a tactic TeamT5 refers to as the “fail-of-trust” model.
Meanwhile, malware operations are shifting toward lightweight, disposable tools and multi-tool attack chains. This approach reduces single points of failure, allowing attackers to maintain access even if one component is detected or blocked, and creates a fragmented footprint that is harder for defenders to fully investigate and eradicate.
Security Officer Comments:
At the same time, researchers are observing a significant shift from individual APT groups toward a China-nexus, “whole-of-nation” cyber ecosystem. In this model, the Chinese state sets strategic priorities, while a network of private contractors and specialist vendors executes operations, effectively blurring the line between government and commercial activity. Recent leaks, indictments, and sanctions show that these companies are not just providing tools, but they are also actively involved in carrying out intrusions. TeamT5 notes that today’s campaigns increasingly resemble a service-based supply chain, with different providers responsible for reconnaissance, exploit and malware development, and command-and-control infrastructure, including operational relay box networks. This modular approach allows for faster, larger-scale operations with greater resilience compared to traditional single-team APT campaigns.
Suggested Corrections:
Defensive implications:
https://teamt5.org/en/posts/apt-threat-landscape-in-apac-2025-industrialization-of-intrusions/
Threat activity across the Asia-Pacific region is continuing to intensify, with more than 510 advanced persistent threat (APT) operations recorded globally in 2025, according to TeamT5. Taiwan remains the most heavily targeted location, accounting for 173 of the tracked attacks, far exceeding any other country in the region. Researchers say the activity is largely driven by China-linked threat actors and reflects Taiwan’s strategic importance in regional geopolitics and the global technology supply chain, with the island increasingly used as a testing ground for new intrusion tools and techniques before they are deployed more broadly.
Several key technical trends stand out in this activity. According to TeamT5, attackers are increasingly shifting away from traditional endpoints and instead targeting network edge devices such as firewalls, routers, and VPN appliances, with TeamT5 tracking 27 critical vulnerabilities in 2025, most of them affecting these systems. In many cases, exploitation is followed by the installation of custom backdoors that can survive reboots and even persist after patches are applied.
Threat actors are also increasingly abusing IoT and NAS devices as quiet, low-profile relay infrastructure, allowing them to obscure command-and-control traffic and exfiltrate data without raising suspicion. These devices blend into normal network activity, making it difficult for defenders to spot malicious operations in real time.
At the same time, supply chain attacks are accelerating, with Chinese-linked actors targeting IT service providers and telecom operators as stepping stones into government, military, and critical infrastructure networks. By exploiting these trusted relationships, attackers can bypass conventional defenses, a tactic TeamT5 refers to as the “fail-of-trust” model.
Meanwhile, malware operations are shifting toward lightweight, disposable tools and multi-tool attack chains. This approach reduces single points of failure, allowing attackers to maintain access even if one component is detected or blocked, and creates a fragmented footprint that is harder for defenders to fully investigate and eradicate.
Security Officer Comments:
At the same time, researchers are observing a significant shift from individual APT groups toward a China-nexus, “whole-of-nation” cyber ecosystem. In this model, the Chinese state sets strategic priorities, while a network of private contractors and specialist vendors executes operations, effectively blurring the line between government and commercial activity. Recent leaks, indictments, and sanctions show that these companies are not just providing tools, but they are also actively involved in carrying out intrusions. TeamT5 notes that today’s campaigns increasingly resemble a service-based supply chain, with different providers responsible for reconnaissance, exploit and malware development, and command-and-control infrastructure, including operational relay box networks. This modular approach allows for faster, larger-scale operations with greater resilience compared to traditional single-team APT campaigns.
Suggested Corrections:
Defensive implications:
- Indicator-driven detection is no longer sufficient
- Defenders must prioritize behavior-based, hypothesis-driven threat hunting
- Ecosystem-level intelligence and international collaboration are required to disrupt different stages of the intrusion supply chain, not just individual tools or campaigns.
https://teamt5.org/en/posts/apt-threat-landscape-in-apac-2025-industrialization-of-intrusions/