China Researches Ways to Disrupt Satellite Internet
Summary:
Research emerging from China indicates a concentrated and strategic effort to develop countermeasures against Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite internet constellations, particularly SpaceX's Starlink, which Beijing views as a major national security threat.
This concern intensified after Starlink's effective use by Ukrainian forces to maintain critical communications during the conflict with Russia. Chinese military and government scientists have published numerous papers that assess Starlink's dual-use capabilities, both commercial communication and potential U.S. military applications and outline both "soft kill" (electronic warfare) and "hard kill" (physical destruction) strategies. The core challenge is the sheer number and dynamic nature of the LEO satellites, which are much harder to disrupt than traditional geostationary systems.
One recent and notable study simulated a large-scale electronic warfare operation to disrupt Starlink over an area the size of Taiwan. Given that Starlink terminals constantly switch between thousands of fast-moving satellites, a single ground-based jammer is ineffective. The solution proposed by researchers from institutions like the Beijing Institute of Technology is a distributed signal blocking strategy. This plan calls for deploying a swarm of approximately 1,000 to 2,000 specially adapted electronic warfare drones flying at high altitude. These synchronized drones would create a temporary "electromagnetic shield" capable of broadly jamming signals across the entire region, effectively cutting off LEO satellite communication for the duration of a potential conflict.
Beyond electronic jamming, Chinese researchers have also explored more direct "hard kill" methods to neutralize the LEO threat. These proposed physical countermeasures include developing custom-built attack satellites equipped with ion thrusters or corrosive materials to interfere with Starlink's solar panels and batteries. Other unconventional strategies suggested in these papers involve fitting stealth submarines with space-shooting lasers that could target satellites from a retractable mast upon surfacing. Additionally, researchers have studied the vulnerabilities within Starlink's complex supply chain, suggesting supply-chain sabotage as a non-kinetic method to degrade the system. The overall goal of this extensive research is to develop a comprehensive set of capabilities that can neutralize LEO satellite networks on a massive, constellation-wide scale, rather than relying on cost-prohibitive measures to target individual satellites.
Security Officer Comments:
This is a very interesting look at how China is preparing to disrupt future technologies during times of geopolitical conflict. Notably, China has also been pre-positioning themselves across critical infrastructure networks with “just-in-case” malware. The most interesting finding is the move from kinetic attacks on satellites to a more tangible, scalable "soft kill" area-denial strategy. China's research into using a massive swarm of 1,000 to 2,000 electronic warfare drones is effectively an admission that the traditional method of jamming Starlink from the ground is obsolete due to the constellation's mesh network resilience and real-time frequency hopping.
While the research is impressive, deploying, coordinating, powering, and sustaining thousands of synchronized jamming platforms at high altitude is a monumental logistical task, but China has shown it’s dominance in the global drone market.
Suggested Corrections:
From a defensive standpoint, three immediate areas of required adaptation:
https://www.swfound.org/publications-and-reports/2025-global-counterspace-capabilities-report
Research emerging from China indicates a concentrated and strategic effort to develop countermeasures against Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite internet constellations, particularly SpaceX's Starlink, which Beijing views as a major national security threat.
This concern intensified after Starlink's effective use by Ukrainian forces to maintain critical communications during the conflict with Russia. Chinese military and government scientists have published numerous papers that assess Starlink's dual-use capabilities, both commercial communication and potential U.S. military applications and outline both "soft kill" (electronic warfare) and "hard kill" (physical destruction) strategies. The core challenge is the sheer number and dynamic nature of the LEO satellites, which are much harder to disrupt than traditional geostationary systems.
One recent and notable study simulated a large-scale electronic warfare operation to disrupt Starlink over an area the size of Taiwan. Given that Starlink terminals constantly switch between thousands of fast-moving satellites, a single ground-based jammer is ineffective. The solution proposed by researchers from institutions like the Beijing Institute of Technology is a distributed signal blocking strategy. This plan calls for deploying a swarm of approximately 1,000 to 2,000 specially adapted electronic warfare drones flying at high altitude. These synchronized drones would create a temporary "electromagnetic shield" capable of broadly jamming signals across the entire region, effectively cutting off LEO satellite communication for the duration of a potential conflict.
Beyond electronic jamming, Chinese researchers have also explored more direct "hard kill" methods to neutralize the LEO threat. These proposed physical countermeasures include developing custom-built attack satellites equipped with ion thrusters or corrosive materials to interfere with Starlink's solar panels and batteries. Other unconventional strategies suggested in these papers involve fitting stealth submarines with space-shooting lasers that could target satellites from a retractable mast upon surfacing. Additionally, researchers have studied the vulnerabilities within Starlink's complex supply chain, suggesting supply-chain sabotage as a non-kinetic method to degrade the system. The overall goal of this extensive research is to develop a comprehensive set of capabilities that can neutralize LEO satellite networks on a massive, constellation-wide scale, rather than relying on cost-prohibitive measures to target individual satellites.
Security Officer Comments:
This is a very interesting look at how China is preparing to disrupt future technologies during times of geopolitical conflict. Notably, China has also been pre-positioning themselves across critical infrastructure networks with “just-in-case” malware. The most interesting finding is the move from kinetic attacks on satellites to a more tangible, scalable "soft kill" area-denial strategy. China's research into using a massive swarm of 1,000 to 2,000 electronic warfare drones is effectively an admission that the traditional method of jamming Starlink from the ground is obsolete due to the constellation's mesh network resilience and real-time frequency hopping.
While the research is impressive, deploying, coordinating, powering, and sustaining thousands of synchronized jamming platforms at high altitude is a monumental logistical task, but China has shown it’s dominance in the global drone market.
Suggested Corrections:
From a defensive standpoint, three immediate areas of required adaptation:
- Anti-Jam Resilience: Satellite systems must rapidly accelerate anti-jamming capabilities, including better frequency agility, adaptive beamforming on user terminals, and even stronger end-to-end encryption to distinguish noise from usable signal.
- Air Defense: The drone swarm itself becomes a critical target. The U.S. and its allies must invest heavily in low-cost, high-volume counter-UAS systems, such as directed energy weapons (lasers) or cheap kinetic interceptors, that can effectively neutralize a massive drone swarm without wasting expensive precision missiles.
- Digital Resilience: This reinforces the need for Taiwan and U.S. forces to diversify their communication doctrine, treating Starlink as a valuable but degradable asset. Resilient communications must include hardened fiber optics, secure terrestrial fallback networks, and diversified satellite links to survive a sustained denial attempt.
https://www.swfound.org/publications-and-reports/2025-global-counterspace-capabilities-report