ShadowSilk Campaign Targets Central Asian Governments
Summary:
In 2024, Group-IB released an in-depth report examining a newly identified cyber-espionage collective known as ShadowSilk. According to the report, the group has been active since at least early 2023 and has primarily targeted government ministries, state institutions, and organizations in Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. The researchers estimate that more than 35 government entities have been compromised in less than two years, highlighting the scale and persistence of ShadowSilk’s campaigns. Group-IB’s analysis found significant overlaps between ShadowSilk and a previously documented cluster of malicious activity called YoroTrooper. The connection became evident through the discovery of shared command-and-control infrastructure, similar malware codebases, and overlapping operational methods. Both groups were observed deploying phishing campaigns as their primary initial access vector, often sending emails with malicious attachments or links disguised as government or diplomatic communications. While the report stops short of definitive attribution, forensic artifacts from compromised servers suggest that ShadowSilk operators were active in Russian- and Chinese-speaking environments, pointing to potential cross-border collaboration or a dual influence.
The joint investigation by Group-IB and CERT-KG provided unprecedented insight into the group’s operations. By obtaining an image of one of the attackers’ servers, analysts were able to map out ShadowSilk’s full toolkit and operational style. The attackers relied on a hybrid arsenal that included both widely available penetration-testing tools and custom-built malware. Public frameworks like Cobalt Strike and Metasploit were used for initial access, lateral movement, and command execution, while web shells such as Godzilla and Behinder were deployed to maintain persistence within compromised networks. Once inside, ShadowSilk conducted systematic internal reconnaissance, privilege escalation, and credential harvesting, allowing them to exfiltrate sensitive documents, emails, and diplomatic communications without being immediately detected.
Security Officer Comments:
Group-IB’s researchers confirmed that ShadowSilk’s activities went beyond isolated incidents, revealing large-scale coordinated operations across multiple government sectors. The group consistently pursued data theft, suggesting their operations were designed for intelligence gathering rather than immediate financial gain. Target organizations were primarily government ministries and agencies across Central Asia and the APAC region, underscoring a geopolitical motivation behind the campaigns. Interestingly, the analysis of the captured server indicated two separate subgroups within ShadowSilk, each with distinct working languages, one primarily Russian-speaking and the other Chinese-speaking. This finding has raised questions about possible collaboration between actors across different state or regional interests, pointing to a more complex threat landscape than previously understood.
Suggested Corrections:
https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/shadowsilk-targets-central-asian/
In 2024, Group-IB released an in-depth report examining a newly identified cyber-espionage collective known as ShadowSilk. According to the report, the group has been active since at least early 2023 and has primarily targeted government ministries, state institutions, and organizations in Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. The researchers estimate that more than 35 government entities have been compromised in less than two years, highlighting the scale and persistence of ShadowSilk’s campaigns. Group-IB’s analysis found significant overlaps between ShadowSilk and a previously documented cluster of malicious activity called YoroTrooper. The connection became evident through the discovery of shared command-and-control infrastructure, similar malware codebases, and overlapping operational methods. Both groups were observed deploying phishing campaigns as their primary initial access vector, often sending emails with malicious attachments or links disguised as government or diplomatic communications. While the report stops short of definitive attribution, forensic artifacts from compromised servers suggest that ShadowSilk operators were active in Russian- and Chinese-speaking environments, pointing to potential cross-border collaboration or a dual influence.
The joint investigation by Group-IB and CERT-KG provided unprecedented insight into the group’s operations. By obtaining an image of one of the attackers’ servers, analysts were able to map out ShadowSilk’s full toolkit and operational style. The attackers relied on a hybrid arsenal that included both widely available penetration-testing tools and custom-built malware. Public frameworks like Cobalt Strike and Metasploit were used for initial access, lateral movement, and command execution, while web shells such as Godzilla and Behinder were deployed to maintain persistence within compromised networks. Once inside, ShadowSilk conducted systematic internal reconnaissance, privilege escalation, and credential harvesting, allowing them to exfiltrate sensitive documents, emails, and diplomatic communications without being immediately detected.
Security Officer Comments:
Group-IB’s researchers confirmed that ShadowSilk’s activities went beyond isolated incidents, revealing large-scale coordinated operations across multiple government sectors. The group consistently pursued data theft, suggesting their operations were designed for intelligence gathering rather than immediate financial gain. Target organizations were primarily government ministries and agencies across Central Asia and the APAC region, underscoring a geopolitical motivation behind the campaigns. Interestingly, the analysis of the captured server indicated two separate subgroups within ShadowSilk, each with distinct working languages, one primarily Russian-speaking and the other Chinese-speaking. This finding has raised questions about possible collaboration between actors across different state or regional interests, pointing to a more complex threat landscape than previously understood.
Suggested Corrections:
- It’s important to use email protection measures to prevent initial compromise through spear-phishing emails.
- Observe any use of commands and built-in tools that are frequently used for collecting information about the system and files.
- Combine strict application control, patching, and high-fidelity MXDR analytics keyed to known malware artefacts.
- Ensure that your security measures allow for proactive threat hunting in order to identify threats that cannot be detected automatically.
- Keeping your organization secure requires ongoing vigilance. Utilizing a proprietary solution like Group-IB’s Threat Intelligence can enhance your security posture by providing teams with advanced insights into emerging cyber threats allowing you to identify potential risks sooner and implement defenses more proactively.
- Regular monitoring of relevant sections of the dark web and data leaks will help keep your finger on the pulse and adequately assess the current state of the organization’s security.
https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/shadowsilk-targets-central-asian/