Summary:
This incident involved a new ransomware sample that, at first glance, appeared to be a typical DragonForce build, but in fact, was really a hybrid variant used by DEVMAN or an affiliate partner associated with them.

DragonForce itself is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation that adopted much of its code and infrastructure from Conti—one of the most prolific ransomware families ever deployed. This reuse of Conti’s leaked source code has spawned multiple derivative strains. In this case, DEVMAN (or an affiliate) seems to have grabbed a DragonForce build, applied only minimal modifications (mainly changing file extensions and a few embedded strings), and deployed it without fully testing the results.

This approach reflects a growing trend: attackers increasingly rely on shared ransomware kits and semi-custom builds, rather than creating their own tooling from scratch. The result is often sloppy or inconsistent behavior, as seen here.

Security Officer Comments:
DEVMAN is an emerging ransomware gang that reuses and lightly modifies code from the DragonForce/Conti family. DEVMAN maintains a Dedicated Leak Site ("Devman's Place") and primarily targets Asian and African organizations, with sporadic activity in Latin America and Europe. The group is likely running a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model, enabling affiliates to create derivative versions and leveraging past Conti and DragonForce infrastructure and tooling.

Suggested Corrections:
Backup your data, system images, and configurations, regularly test them, and keep the backups offline: Ensure that backups are regularly tested and that they are not connected to the business network, as many ransomware variants try to find and encrypt or delete accessible backups. Maintaining current backups offline is critical because if your network data is encrypted with ransomware, your organization can restore systems.

Update and patch systems promptly: This includes maintaining the security of operating systems, applications, and firmware in a timely manner. Consider using a centralized patch management system; use a risk-based assessment strategy to drive your patch management program.

Test your incident response plan: There's nothing that shows the gaps in plans more than testing them. Run through some core questions and use those to build an incident response plan: Are you able to sustain business operations without access to certain systems? For how long? Would you turn off your manufacturing operations if business systems such as billing were offline?

Check your security team's work: Use a 3rd party pen tester to test the security of your systems and your ability to defend against a sophisticated attack. Many ransomware criminals are aggressive and sophisticated and will find the equivalent of unlocked doors.

Segment your networks: There's been a recent shift in ransomware attacks – from stealing data to disrupting operations. It's critically important that your corporate business functions and manufacturing/production operations are separated and that you carefully filter and limit internet access to operational networks, identify links between these networks, and develop workarounds or manual controls to ensure ICS networks can be isolated and continue operating if your corporate network is compromised. Regularly test contingency plans such as manual controls so that safety-critical functions can be maintained during a cyber incident.

Train employees: Email remains the most vulnerable attack vector for organizations. Users should be trained on how to avoid and spot phishing emails.

Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA): External-facing assets that leverage single-factor authentication (SFA) are highly susceptible to brute-forcing attacks, password spraying, or unauthorized remote access using valid (stolen) credentials. Implementing MFA enhances security and adds an extra layer of protection.

Link(s):
https://any.run/cybersecurity-blog/devman-ransomware-analysis/