Summary:
Symantec researchers have identified a China-based threat actor, Emperor Dragonfly, leveraging RA World ransomware in a financially motivated attack against an Asian software and services company in late 2024. Previously linked to cybercriminal activity, the group’s use of a toolset traditionally associated with Chinese state-sponsored espionage raises concerns about a growing convergence between state-backed intelligence operations and ransomware-driven cybercrime. The attackers initially demanded a $2 million ransom and demonstrated a sophisticated approach by deploying malware previously used in classic espionage campaigns. Between July 2024 and January 2025, Emperor Dragonfly targeted government ministries and telecom operators across Southeast Europe and Asia, seeking long-term persistence within their networks. The group utilized a specific variant of the PlugX (Korplug) backdoor, which was delivered via DLL sideloading using a Toshiba executable and a malicious DLL . Additionally, they employed NPS proxy, a China-developed covert communication tool, and various RC4-encrypted payloads to maintain access and evade detection.

In November 2024, a similar attack targeted a South Asian software company. The same Korplug payload was deployed, but this time, it was followed by an RA World ransomware attack, indicating a shift from intelligence collection to direct financial extortion. Symantec researchers attribute the network infiltration to the exploitation of a Palo Alto PAN-OS vulnerability (CVE-2024-0012), allowing the attackers to gain initial access before executing the sideloading technique to install the Korplug backdoor and ultimately encrypting systems with ransomware.

Security Officer Comments:
RA World is believed to have emerged from RA Group, which was first observed in 2023 as a Babuk-based ransomware family. A July 2024 report by Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 also linked Emperor Dragonfly to RA World, albeit with low confidence. This potential crossover between espionage and ransomware operations raises concerns that Chinese state-backed cyber operatives may be "moonlighting" as ransomware actors for personal financial gain, leveraging their access and expertise for criminal purposes.

Suggested Corrections:
Backup your data, system images, and configurations, regularly test them, and keep the backups offline: Ensure that backups are regularly tested and that they are not connected to the business network, as many ransomware variants try to find and encrypt or delete accessible backups. Maintaining current backups offline is critical because if your network data is encrypted with ransomware, your organization can restore systems.

Update and patch systems promptly: This includes maintaining the security of operating systems, applications, and firmware in a timely manner. Consider using a centralized patch management system; use a risk-based assessment strategy to drive your patch management program.

Test your incident response plan: There's nothing that shows the gaps in plans more than testing them. Run through some core questions and use those to build an incident response plan: Are you able to sustain business operations without access to certain systems? For how long? Would you turn off your manufacturing operations if business systems such as billing were offline?

Check Your Security Team's Work: Use a 3rd party pen tester to test the security of your systems and your ability to defend against a sophisticated attack. Many ransomware criminals are aggressive and sophisticated and will find the equivalent of unlocked doors.

Segment your networks: There's been a recent shift in ransomware attacks – from stealing data to disrupting operations. It's critically important that your corporate business functions and manufacturing/production operations are separated and that you carefully filter and limit internet access to operational networks, identify links between these networks, and develop workarounds or manual controls to ensure ICS networks can be isolated and continue operating if your corporate network is compromised. Regularly test contingency plans such as manual controls so that safety-critical functions can be maintained during a cyber incident.

Train employees: Email remains the most vulnerable attack vector for organizations. Users should be trained on how to avoid and spot phishing emails. Multi-factor authentication can help prevent malicious access to sensitive services.

Link(s):
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/ne...tools-deployed-in-ra-world-ransomware-attack/
https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/chinese-espionage-ransomware